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Abstract 
The growing role of institutions and their influence on the labour 
market outcomes, i.e. wage rates and labour allocation, has been among the 
most significant characteristic features of labour markets in recent decades. 
Labour market economics built its paradigm on the principles of 
marginalism, which brought suitable instruments for analysis of market 
agents´ individual decisions capable of achieving effective solutions. Smith´s 
“invisible hand” has gradually been limited by institutional interventions – 
by governments, corporations and trade unions with government legislation, 
corporate personnel policies and collective bargaining. The expanding 
regulatory interventions into the labour market and the effort to explain the 
reality leads inevitably to the fact that modern labour market economics 
incorporates more and more institutional theories.  
The contribution outlines the gradual invasion of neoinstitutional topics and 
theories into the neoclassical labour market paradigm and it analyses the 
differences in the neoclassical and neoinstitutional interpretation of labour 
markets’ functioning. The recent discussion on the consequences for labour 
market economics theory is presented. A conclusion about the gradual 
direction towards a changed paradigm of labour market economics is 
presented.  
 
Keywords: modern labour economics, neoclassical theory, institutional 
theory,  dual markets, efficiency wages, labour market institutions  
 
Introduction  
The most significant characteristic features of labour markets in 
recent decades are the growing role of institutions, public policies and 
governmental regulations and their influence on the outputs of the labour 
markets – the wage rates and labour allocation. Labour market economics 
built its paradigm on marginalist principles, which brought suitable 
instruments for analysing decisions of particular subjects on competitive 
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markets, able to reach effective solutions. There are rational subjects acting 
on these markets, maximizing utilities, profits and rents according to their 
preferences. Smith’s “invisible hand” has been curtailed by institutional 
interventions – the government, corporations and trade unions with 
governmental legislation, corporate personal politics and collective 
bargaining. These extra-market mechanisms shape the reality of 
contemporary labour markets. This is projected onto the constant press for 
change in the field of the theoretical labour market mainstream itself, which 
has, so far, featured neoclassical characteristics. The expanding regulatory 
interventions into the labour market and the effort to explain reality leads 
inevitably to the fact that modern labour market economics includes more 
and more institutional theories. The aim of the contribution is to outline the 
gradual invasion of neoinstitutional topics and theories into the neoclassical 
labour market paradigm and to point out the differences between neoclassical 
and institutional interpretations of labour market functioning and the recent 
debate on the consequences of these changes  for labour market economic 
theory.   
 
The article uses methods of verbal and comparative analysis, 
generalisation and logical deduction when drawing conclusions.   
1. The neoclassical paradigm and market forces 
     The neoclassical paradigm, which grew from the principles and 
approaches of marginalism, laid the principles of economic theory itself into 
the basis of labour market economics. The model of Marshall's partial 
competitive labour market with market supply and market demand derived 
from descending marginal labour product (Principles of Economics, 1890) 
was described in more exact detail by Nobel Prize winner John R. Hicks.  
Smith's “invisible hand” effectively distributes work tasks based on the 
values of their marginal products and cleans labour markets to the last 
sweep. This original version of neoclassical economics – “market theory” or 
“price theory” focuses on formation of prices, seeks the rules and principles 
of behaviour of the subjects on the market and describes it analytically. The 
other factors, such as legal institutions and rules of entrepreneurship, rules of 
property distribution or social infrastructure are not examined, because they 
are treated as given. 
     The Hicks’ The Theory of Wages (1932)20 is a work from the branch of 
                                                          
20 Two years later, in 1934, the same-named book The Theory of Wages by Paul Douglas 
differently from Hicks combined the theoretical approach with real problems and the aid of 
public policies on the labour market. He emphasised the importance of labour market 
imperfections and the role of unions and themes associated with the institutional school.  
Included, for example, are chapters on the situation of women and children on the labour 
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labour market economics, which corresponds to the structure of the book. It 
develops fundamental theoretical concepts of labour supply and demand for 
labour and marginal productivity theory, it analyses the competitive market 
and the undesirable effects of governmental regulations. Hicks’ analysis of 
labour supply was influenced by an article by L. Robbins (On a Certain 
Ambiguity in the Conception of Stationary Equilibrium, 1930), which set the 
conditions for positive and negative slopes of individual labour supply, and 
mentioned for the first time that the individual labour supply curve can be 
backward-bending. After implementation of indifference curves and the 
ordinalist approach, the explanation of consumers’ decision making gets 
easier. The shape of individual labour supply was explained by the 
significance of substitution and income effect in the wage rate increase.   
     In the following years, another shift took place, and it was towards a 
greater openness and a broadening of the scope of neoclassical labour market 
theory. The methodology and the research topics changed. G. Becker no 
longer examines the functioning of markets "per se", but creates a model of 
rational economic behaviour and decision making in favour of the welfare of 
the subject, applied to all aspects of human life (The Economic Approach to 
Human Behaviour, 1976). This modern version of neoclassical theory, the 
choice theory, expects a rational economic entity, which maximises its 
advantages with the resources that it has at its disposal based on its 
preferences. Markets are designed to be competitive; they determine stable 
equilibrium and provide efficient allocation of labour.   
     He contributed to the development of modern labour market economics 
with three fundamental contributions. In 1957, he published The Economics 
of Discrimination, where he analysed discrimination economically and 
related decision making based on the discrimination preferences of the 
discriminating subject itself. The preferences were measured by the 
discrimination coefficient. Together with T. Schultz, he brought to the world 
of economic science the topic of human capital (Human Capital, 1964), 
while education and job preparation is understood as a form of investment: 
people and companies decide according to cost and expected profits about 
the extent of this investment. The human capital theory also included 
migration theory; geographic labour mobility, which seeks greater evaluation 
of human capital on the labour market, bears all the attributes of an 
investment.   
     The third contribution of G. Becker to labour market economics was the 
theory of household production; where people decide between housework, 
work on the labour market and leisure time (A Theory of the Allocation of 
                                                                                                                                                     
market, immigration, poverty, trade unions, education, labour laws, and the improvement of 
living conditions.   
European Scientific Journal October 2016 edition vol.12, No.28  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
544 
Time, 1965). The theory of household production was then elaborated by 
Becker, including various aspects of family decisions in A Treatise on the 
Family (1981). An analysis of women’s participation on the labour market 
and their deciding between housework and work on the labour market was 
brought to the fore by J. Mincer in 1962 (Labour Force Participation of 
Married Women). Married women’s participation rate in the labour market 
is, according to Mincer, in negative relation to the income of the whole 
family (the income effect) and in positive relation to their own wage rate (in 
the case of a constant income, the substitution effect). The line of women’s 
participation in labour market research in all possible connections and 
consequences, including the gender wage gap, was later developed by other 
authors, e.g. F. Blau, L. Kahn (1996), C. Goldin (1992), Hoffman, Averett 
(2010).  
     The confrontation of neoclassical theory with the reality of the labour 
market in the 1960s, with persisting unemployment, gave rise to new 
theories. These theories already took into consideration that the labour 
market is less competitive and there are market imperfections, rigid wages  
and imperfect and asymmetric information. The theory of job search (G. 
Stigler, 1961) shows getting information as a costly activity of job searching. 
One therefore minimises opportunity costs, when staying unemployed as a 
rational choice and continues to search if the first employment offer is not 
optimal. A. Alchian (1970) described this unemployment, which is a 
voluntary feature of market equilibrium, as self-employment in information 
collection, D. Mortensen (1970) called it search unemployment and 
characterised it as a result of voluntary conduct on both sides of the labour 
market. It was shown that in the decline of demand on the labour market, the 
wages do not decline as is predicted by neoclassical theory, which would 
clean the markets, but people are dismissed from employment. The absence 
of the market cleaning wage was explained by C. Azariadis (1975) by the 
theory of the implicit wages, according to which risk averse employees prefer 
a lower and secure wage paid in a long period over a higher wage but within 
more uncertainty. Companies therefore offer implicit long-term contracts, 
granting long-term income security. This is the reason why wages cannot 
decrease.  
 
2. Neoclassical labour market process with neoinstitutional theories 
     In Smith’s competitive market, the wage rate changes in response to 
changes in supply or demand, and workers move from markets with excess 
supply to those where demand prevails. The boundaries of this natural 
market are based on the limits of competition, the flow of information, 
transferability of skills and workers’ willingness to commute to work. 
Institutions implement rules, standards, directives and regulations, which 
European Scientific Journal October 2016 edition vol.12, No.28  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
545 
artificially define the dimensions of the labour market. These rules are either 
formal (written) or informal (habitual). They determine, for example, who is 
competent to carry out a certain profession or hold a certain work position, 
and they relate to the issuance of licences and certificates and create barriers 
for entry into professions. They determine who will be given priority during 
the creation of a working collective. These rules have the form of corporate 
HR policies, union contracts and government legislation. 
     According to neoclassical theory, employees with the same skills and in 
positions with the same characteristics should earn the same wage. If it is not 
the case, employees with a lower wage rate will migrate to better paid 
positions, which will bring wage rates closer together. Here will be, although 
imperfectly, enforced the rule of the one price law. The wage differences 
should correspond to the different characteristics of employees (on the 
supply side), e. g. differences in their human capital (the wages would 
include different human capital return) or the non-financial characteristics of 
the position (demand side), such as working conditions, risk extent (wages 
would include different amounts for compensation) and not the sector or the 
possibilities of individual companies to pay their employees. The real labour 
markets produce persisting wage differences between sectors or companies 
hiring similar employees in similar positions and decide according to their 
own rules. Institutions fragment the labour market into a large number of 
segmented, mutually divided markets. Institutions implement structures, 
artificial boundaries and barriers, which cause rigidity in the labour market. 
 
Dual markets theory 
     Dual labour market theory is connected with the names of P. Doeringer 
and M. Piore and their book Internal Labor Market and Manpower Analysis 
from 1971 (2nd ed. in 1985). They had a wide range of predecessors who 
examined real labour markets and analysed according to which the 
companies, the tenant of labour, decide and how they choose their 
employees, how these markets work and which relationships are among 
them. 
     By the 1950s, L. Reynolds (1951), on the basis of his labour markets 
analysis, states that every company employing labour is an independent, 
divided labour market. This explains a significant dispersion of wages 
among companies. Reynolds found in his research that other factors, extra-
wage conditions and offered benefits at the particular positions deepen these 
differences and not diminish them.  C. Kerr (1954) in his article on the 
“balkanisation” of labour markets develops a concept of “institutional” 
labour markets, which are directed by formal and informal rules much more 
so than by market processes and magnitudes as presupposed by neoclassical 
economics. These institutional labour markets are in fact divided and not 
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mutually competing. The defined systems of rules which regulate the 
behaviour and decision making of firms, built barriers between firms’ labour 
markets and clearly define “the points of entrance”. The employees on such 
a market are not in direct competition with those standing outside the market. 
They are protected from the competition and it is more difficult for 
employees standing outside to get into such markets.   
     The term internal labour markets was used by J. Dunlop in 1966. He 
states21 that employers in their companies create and develop a set of rules 
that determine the promotion of employees, their movements inside the 
company, temporary dismissal, retirement of different groups of workers, 
etc. Decision making by employers according to their own rules significantly 
influences the labour market, which no longer functions according to 
neoclassical market principles.  
     Doeringer and Piore (1971) defined an internal labour market as an 
"administrative unit ... where the pricing and allocation of labour are 
managed by a set of administrative rules and procedures." The internal 
labour market is so different from the external labour market, where 
"decisions on pricing and allocation of labour and professional training of the 
employees is directly controlled by economic variables."22 The migration of 
employees between the two markets is only possible through the created 
“ports of entry and exit." Vacancies on the internal markets are filled by 
promotions or transfer of employees who have already gained access to these 
markets. The positions in these markets are thus protected from direct 
exposure to market forces in external markets. Doeringer and Piore also 
examined the implications of such functioning of labour markets. One of 
them is that the labour market is segmented into primary and secondary 
markets.23 Positions in the primary sector are characterised by relatively high 
wages, good working conditions, employment stability, and numerous 
opportunities for promotion and career development. On the other hand, 
positions in the secondary markets are low-paid, and are characterised by 
high fluctuation, poor working conditions and little chance for promotion.24 
The employees with insufficient or inadequate skills or poor professional 
CVs are limited to secondary markets work. They are the ones who are hired 
in last and are the first to be dismissed by the companies. They never get into 
the primary sector, which is associated with internal labour markets.  
     The literature on dual labour markets and internal markets is relatively 
rich. Further analysis was conducted in the 1970s by L. Thurow (1975), 
Edwards, Reich and Gordon (1975), P. Osterman (1975, 1984) and others. 
                                                          
21 Dunlop ,J., 1966,  p. 32. 
22 Doeringer, P., Piore, M., 1971, pp. 2-3. 
23 See also Piore, M.,1969 
24 Doeringer,P., Piore, M.,1971, p. 166. 
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They examine specific business practices of hiring and rewarding employees, 
the reasons for the existence of internal labour markets, as well as their 
consequences for the different evaluations of similar positions and similar 
employees as well as for the distribution of earnings. Brown and Ashenfelter 
(1986) write on various designs of internal compensation structures. 
     The theory by L. Thurow, the job competition model, can be seen as an 
institutional alternative to the traditional neoclassical approach, under which 
people enter the labour market equipped with certain skills and abilities, and 
in competition with other employees, they compete for current vacancies. 
They choose them according to the wage rates, which compensate them for 
their second best opportunity to bring the highest rent (wage competition 
model). According to Thurow's theory (1975), people compete for positions 
according to the amount of costs that companies will have to spend on their 
professional training for the position. So the decision about who will perform 
such work is made by the company according to the costs of preparation 
required for the execution of work tasks for individual candidates.  
     According to this perspective, the company ranges the candidates in an 
imaginary line. Highly paid appointments are given to the candidates 
possessing the most demanded skills and abilities, and thus minimise costs 
for companies to perform this job. The characteristics that determine the 
position of the employee in the imaginary order of candidates for the position 
are among others: education, innate abilities, personality traits, physical 
condition, age, and more. Different employers attribute to the different 
characteristics of employees a different meaning. Therefore, employees with 
similar characteristics may reach different wage rates and may occupy 
different places in imaginary lines at different employers. 
 
Theory of efficiency wages 
     The wage which is higher than equilibrium one increases the productivity 
of employees through motivating their greater work effort and higher 
performance while minimising the propensity for leaving a job. People who 
are well paid, are powerful and the employer "buys" their effort, 
responsibility and loyalty. Well-paid workers do not depart from their jobs, 
the company will reduce fluctuation and costs of the selection and training of 
new employees, while output and profits increase. Companies that pay wages 
of efficiency also have better, more qualified workers, as they have 
candidates with a higher reservation wage. 
     Higher wages perform a motivational role also in cases where it is 
impossible or very costly for the company to regularly check the output of 
the employee. People in such positions have considerable independence and 
responsibility. They could succumb to moral hazard and engage in activities 
that enhance their own benefit but not benefit the company they work for and 
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who hires them (principal-agent relationship). At this point they would be 
unproductive for the company. 
     The theory of efficiency wages  (J. Yellen, 1984, G. Akerlof, 1986) 
supposes25 that the volume of output produced depends not only on the 
number of employed workers (N) and the amount of real wages (w1), but also 
on efforts performed (e): Q = F (e, w1, N). If the employee receives a wage 
higher than the equilibrium w1 > w *, he or she has the advantage (w1 - w *), 
is well paid and therefore will increase their work effort (e = F (w1 - w *)) 
and will want to keep the position.     On perfectly competitive markets, 
where the equilibrium wage is paid, an employee, when leaving one position, 
finds a similar one with the same wage. It is supposed that workers can 
easily monitored, they therefore cannot avoid work in the working hours. At 
a higher wage rate (higher than the equilibrium) employment decreases (w = 
MRPL) and unemployment is rising. The higher the salary is, the higher is the 
unemployment. Excess of supply over demand produces at the same time 
pressure on wages to fall down and they return to its equilibrium level. 
     The efficiency wage, even if it is higher than equilibrium, is a wage 
maximising the profit of the company. The productivity of the employee 
rises more than the costs on him or her. The company therefore has no 
reason to reduce the wage, because the productivity of the employees would 
decline. If the company reduced the wage, the savings on costs would be 
lower than the loss from the reduced productivity and the profit of the 
company would decrease (Akerlof, Yellen, 1986).    
     Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), in their version with the "no-shirking supply 
curve", assume that the efficiency of staff e = F (w *, w1, u) depends on the 
amount of wage that prevails in the market (w *), the amount of efficiency 
wage (w1) and unemployment rate (u). It will be greater, the greater the 
difference w1 - w * and the higher the unemployment rate (i.e. the more 
difficult it will be to find another position). The high wages make it 
expensive to avoid work, so people tend to work hard. The authors point out 
that it is unemployment that leads workers to work hard and diverts them 
from moral hazard. When unemployment is high, workers will want to keep 
their jobs, since it would be difficult to get a new one, and they will therefore 
be willing not to shirk work at relatively low wages. However, if 
unemployment is very low, companies must offer relatively high wages to 
attract and motivate employees. 
     The wage tends to be high in regions where the unemployment rate is low 
and tends to be low in regions where unemployment is high. Therefore, 
companies that are located in regions with high unemployment may not offer 
high wages to prevent their workers from avoiding work. High 
                                                          
25 Yellen, J., 1984, s. 200. 
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unemployment forces them to work properly, even at low wages. 
Conversely, companies that are located in a region with low unemployment, 
must pay relatively high wages to prevent workers from avoiding work. In a 
competitive labour market  high wages are conversely associated with high 
unemployment, which puts pressure on wages to decline. 
     The contemporary version of efficiency wage theory, the "fair wage - 
effort hypothesis" (Akerlof, Yellen, 1990), explains that workers will 
intentionally limit their work efforts, if they are paid lower wages than a 
wage they find honest and fair. According to this hypothesis, workers create 
the idea of fair wages and their effort depends on the relationship between a 
fair wage and the actual wage. If the actual wage is lower, the supply of the 
employee’s effort will correspond only to normal effort. If e is offered effort, 
w current wage w * fair wage, the fair wage - effort hypothesis states that e = 
min (w / w * 1), where the effort is measured in units, where 1 represents a 
normal effort.26 This hypothesis explains the existence of unemployment, if a 
fair wage exceeds the equilibrium (w* > w). It can also be an explanation of 
why skills and unemployment are negatively correlated, and why there are 
wage differences between market segments. 
     Akerlof and Yellen (1990) pointed to yet another connection: the payment 
of fair wages for certain groups of workers generally increases the wage 
scale, including salaries for other workers in the company who could 
consider fair wages for other workers unearned.27 Due to the fact that in 
different companies the employees present different efforts, the companies 
have different functions of the total products, depending on wages, the 
different companies choose different levels of efficiency wages. This leads to 
the fact that comparable workers with similar abilities can be paid differently 
in different companies and in different industries. The relationship between 
wages and productivity is more important in some sectors than in others. 
Whereby the efficiency wage is often used.  
     The theory of efficiency wages28 provides an explanation of intersectoral 
(between sectors where the efficiency wage is used and where it is not) and 
intrasectoral (between companies with different amounts of efficiency 
wages) wage differentiation. Wage differentiation in various fields is closely 
connected with the theory of dual labour markets (Doeringer, Piore, 1971). 
                                                          
26 Akerlof, G.,Yellen, J.,1990, p. 255. 
27 Akerlof, G.,Yellen, J.,1990, p. 265. 
28 Some authors have doubts about the validity of the efficiency wage model for the situation 
in large corporations, where the qualified employees have a good job and get well paid. 
They are not convinced that the motivation of employees is important for the companies, but 
they say that they prefer other motivation instruments for the higher wages, e.g. 
contributions to pension systems,  which are demanded from the employees and cheaper for 
the companies (Polachek,S.W., Siebert,W.S., 1993). 
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The use of efficiency wages in some branches (sectors) divides labour 
markets and creates a segment with efficiency wage and a segment without 
them. There are studies supporting the hypothesis that the characteristics of 
positions in highly paid sectors (with efficiency wages) resemble the 
characteristics that we would expect in the primary sector, and characteristics 
of positions paid with wages cleaning the market resemble those in the 
secondary sector (Yellen 1984,  Bulow and Summers, 1986, Krueger A.B., 
Summers, L.H., 1988). In the competitive market model the differences 
between segments would be reduced while the workers would move from 
low-wage markets to markets with higher wages. The efficiency wage 
hinders this equalisation process, as companies that pay high wages would 
suffer losses if wages declined because it would decrease the productivity of 
their workforce and total output. 
     The efficiency wage also spoils the application of the traditional 
neoclassical model of employee motivation through   delayed-compensation 
contract, it does not allow employers to create an optimal wage profile of the 
employee. It can be said about this profile, that the worker is, at the 
beginning of his career, normally paid with wages lower than his marginal 
product. The worker is a creditor of the firm; it owes him a debt that is repaid 
gradually in later years, when his salary increases and the end of his career 
begins to exceed the marginal product. Hence, older workers are "overpaid". 
Total paid wages should compensate the total worked product, obviously the 
firm is not willing to pay more. The employees are so motivated for quality 
work for one employer, it increases their effort and productivity. They do not 
want to lose the employment because they want to get the “due amount” 
back. This earnings profile encourages workers not to shirk at all and reduces 
employee fluctuation, as well as company costs of employing labour 
(Carmichael, 1990)29. The firms also do not want to pay workers when they 
reach retirement age. They even have an interest in early retirement, because 
even if the workers are motivated, it is a cheaper solution for them than if 
they had to pay the worker up to normal retirement.30 
  
3. Neoclassic versus neoinstitutionalism or a systhesis of both? The 
recent debate  
     The neoinstitutionalists  focus on the study of everyday problems on the 
labour market in order to determine how labour markets actually work. They 
point out that the elegant neoclassical optimisation models of human 
behaviour, pursuing their own preference on competitive markets, which 
leads to a balance, are not real. On the labour markets, the decisive role is 
                                                          
29 This critique is known as a "bonding critique". 
30 See e.g. Hutchens, R.M., 1986, Delayed Payment Contracts and a Firm´s Propensity to 
Hire Older Workers,  Lazear E.P.,1979, Why is There Mandatory Retirement?  
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possessed by great corporations, trade unions, and according to their own 
(extra-market) rules and regulations, there is persisting market imperfection, 
limited information and unequal opportunities. To all of this the 
neoinstitutionalists ascribe greater importance in shaping market outcomes 
(employment and wage rates) than neoclassicists do.  
     The neoclassicists  emphasise the competitive nature of labour markets 
and the primacy of market forces in the determination of equilibrium wages 
and employment, neoinstitutionalists emphasise the role of institutional 
forces - large companies, trade unions and governments. While neoclassicists 
criticise interventions into labour markets, such as union demands for wages, 
minimum wages or affirmative action, neoinstitutionalists find these 
interventions in labour markets useful and beneficial. They do not believe 
that market forces could act as strongly and effectively as it is claimed by the 
neoclassicists.   Greater weight is attributed to market imperfections, such as 
rigidity of wages, persistent unemployment and discrimination, barriers to 
mobility and limited information. In their theories, they give space to non-
market institutions such as corporate policies, practice of human resources 
managements, or habits. 
     The neoclassical authors point to the need to adapt the theory of price 
formation on the labour market to the specific conditions that determine the 
established rules and standards of behaviour and decisions of individual 
companies when hiring labour, deciding on wage rates, on career 
progression, etc. Boyer and Smith (2001) resemble neoclassical economics 
labour market to the dry bones, i.e. the fundament of modern analysis, while 
the neoinstitutional practical empiricism - the green tree of life, shows 
another way of scientific research. "If the new areas of inquiry within 
neoclassical labour economics are in fact driven by the imperatives of 
science, then the neoinstitutionalist interests may permanently fuse with the 
neoclassical approach.”31 
     The neoinstitutionalists point out that human motivations are often 
characterised not only by individual interests, but also by altruism, which 
itself gives satisfaction. People may not directly "maximise" but achieve 
only a certain sufficient level of satisfaction. One does not have to work hard 
just because he or she expects high wages, but also for the feeling of a job 
well done, which is called the "intrinsic motivation". People’s choices are, 
according to the  neoinstitutionalists, less rational and less consistent than it 
is predicted by neoclassical models of rational choice. The human brain has 
its limits and is clouded by emotions, which makes it hard to make the 
optimal choices; people decide with limited rationality32. People's 
                                                          
31 Boyer, G.R., Smith, R.S., 2001, p. 219. 
32 Kaufman, B.E., Hotchkiss, J.L., 2006,  p.33,  Kaufman, B.E.,1999, Emotional Arousal as 
Source of  Bounded Rationality. 
European Scientific Journal October 2016 edition vol.12, No.28  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
552 
preferences are not independent and, according to neoinstitutionalists, they 
are mutually interdependent, therefore, people and groups affect others by 
their behaviour. They emphasise the "fairness" of human behaviour. 
Preferences are not exogenous, given as the neoclassicists work with them, 
but they change with the development of society and with the economic 
system. 
The neoinstitutionalists advocate and apply a broader 
interdisciplinary approach and import useful concepts and theories from 
other disciplines to economics. Their theory must be realistic, hence they 
prefer inductive methods. They stand against abstractions and generalisations 
that do not address specific situations. Also  marginalist rules of neoclassical 
theory interpret the decision making process of economic actors 
unrealistically according to them; in fact it is decided rather by the average 
variables than the marginal ones, on which the information is missing. 
Kaufman and Hotchkiss (2006) ask the question: is the modern 
economics of labour markets a pragmatic blend of neoclassicism and 
neoinstitutionalism?33 A prevailing conviction among economists is that the 
boundaries between the worlds of neoclassical and neoinstitutional labour 
economics are becoming blurred in time and will be erased, and they see this 
way as inspiring and usable. Examples include the neoclassical acceptance of 
interdependent preferences, decision making under conditions of limited 
information and recognition of the role of extra-market practices of 
institutions. Neoinstitutionalists again cross the dividing line by the adoption 
and acceptance of neoclassical methods, techniques and tools (optimisation 
from limited resources, marginal analysis, etc.). 
Kaufman and Hotchkiss (2006) believe that modern labour market 
economics is less explicitly neoclassical or less explicitly institutional and it 
is theoretically more mixed, with emphasis on the understanding of reality in 
all its forms, including the use of the abstract model and empirical testing of 
hypotheses. They are inclined to conclude that current modern labour 
economics is more neoclassical in form and more institutional in content. 
“Their possible synthesis and reconciliation in what is today often called 
“modern labour economics” is then considered.”34 
     Also Cahuc, Carcillo and Zylberger included chapters dedicated to public 
policy analysis and decisions of politicians and firms about measures 
intervening into labour markets in the second edition of their book Labor 
Economics (2014). The new chapters are devoted also to wage inequalities, 
income redistribution and protection of employees against risk on the labour 
market. 
                                                          
33 Kaufman, B.E., Hotchkiss, R.S., 2006, p. 34. 
34 Kaufman, B.E., Hotchkiss, R.S., 2006, p. 27. 
European Scientific Journal October 2016 edition vol.12, No.28  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
553 
     The discussion takes place at the level of theory about the extent to which 
markets are still capable of self-regulation and delivering effective solutions, 
and to what extent this ability has been reduced and replaced by decision-
making of institutions. It also raises questions that go beyond the scope of 
this contribution, for example, to what extent is this expanding process of the 
weakening of market forces beneficial to society? Or, does society achieve 
greater economic welfare with intervention and regulation, or without them? 
At the level of methodology, it is about a debate on plurality and 
multidisciplinarity of methods that would be acceptable for neoclassicists, 
originally insisting on a strong tie to unidisciplinarity.  
 
Conclusion:  
The literature on segmented labour markets documenting the 
differences between outputs of the real labour markets and neoclassical 
predictions proves that the agents on the market make decisions with respect 
to the formal rules of individual employers and generally accepted informal 
rules of the functioning of markets. Neoclassical “homo economicus”, who is 
independent and focused on himself, is now more insistently aware of how 
his effort to maximise his own welfare is influenced and deformed by the 
institutional environment, the mutual individual and institutional 
dependency, and formal procedures that lead to different results than those 
based on the principle of competition. The different institutional context and 
interdependence of participants in the transactions create different occasions 
for similar individuals, set different wage rates and allow other career paths 
for them. Additionally, it is a call for further expansion of neoclassical 
economics in the analysis of the determinants of wages, which is designed by 
a set of rules created by individual employers, and the related conversion of a 
neoclassical type of market agent with respect to the broader social context. 
Whether we are moderate followers only of content changes 
respectively, content expansion and methodological innovations of labour 
market economics in the frame of the original neoclassical paradigm, or the 
reality of the labour market leads us to think about a new great synthesis, this 
time of neoclassical economics and neoinstitutionalism, we are witnessing 
and are active participants in the direction towards a modified, if not a new 
economic paradigm of labour market economics. 
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